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CALIFORNIA'S ANTIQUATED ANTI-RIOT
STATUTE: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
More often than not courts are plagued with interpreting a
statute which is either so vague or so complex that it is difficult
to determine the actual legislative intent behind the statute. Judges
review prior cases which set forth the manner in which courts
have construed the code section in an effort to determine what
effect it should be given. Frequently, those prior decisions do not
accurately clarify the legislative intent behind the code.
Such a statute is section 404 of California's Penal Code which
undertakes to define the elements required to constitute a riot.
Enacted in 18721 and not subsequently amended, this statute pre-
sents several problems.
First, section 404 may have been sufficient to cope with the
problem of riot in 1872, but this problem has changed substantially
in the last one hundred years. The courts today are being confronted
with problems concerning riots which were virtually unknown when
the statute was enacted; consequently, the statute has become out-
dated and antiquated. Campus unrest, labor battles, and political
demonstrations are all a part of the new social attitude confronting
the courts. When confronted with these situations in the form of a
prosecution for riotous conduct, the courts have only a statute
enacted in 1872 to rely upon.
Secondly, like the statute itself, most cases dealing with sec-
tion 404 are old and vague. Nearly all of the cases in California
which interpret this section are labor cases concerned with strikers
and pickets. The result is that courts have difficulty in applying
those earlier decisions to modern cases dealing with dissident stu-
dents, political gatherings and war demonstrations.
Finally, the statute affords no guidelines which a court may
follow to determine what conduct is to be considered riotous in
nature. Thus, the question of what constitutes a riot in California
is left to the unfettered discretion of the courts, as section 404
provides no adequate test for such determination.
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION
Penal Code section 404 states that a riot occurs when two
persons, acting together and without the authority of law, use
1 CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
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force or violence, disturb the public peace, or make threats to use
force or violence accompanied by the immediate ability to carry
out those threats.2
A fair reading of this statute sets forth three distinct activities
which may be considered riotous. The statute is written in such
a manner that each phrase describing an activity is separated in
the text of the statute by commas and is plainly another and a
separate ground upon which riotous conduct may be founded.'
These activities are "any use of force or violence, . ..disturbing
the public peace, . . . or any threat to use force or violence, if
accompanied by immediate power of execution ...."'
If this literal construction of section 404 were applied to prac-
tical situations the results would be disastrous. For example, under
the first phrase proscribing any use of force or violence, two per-
sons could be found guilty of riot if they engaged in a fist fight or
any form of a battery. Furthermore, a political meeting in which
the participants carry banners verbally attacking members of the
opposition party and stating that they will be put out of public
office would lie within, the purview of the second activity described
by section 404. Finally, any gathering of demonstrators, or any
picketing, however peaceful, might excite a threat to use force or
violence in the minds of the public, and if accompanied by the
ability to carry out that threat, the members of the gathering
would be in violation of section 404. In short, any violence or
threat of attack, even a verbal or printed one, could make the
members of a gathering liable to the penalties prescribed by the
statute.5
The legislature may not have intended in 1872 that the cover-
age of section 404 be stretched to these extremes. However, there
is nothing in the statute to prevent just that. The section sets forth
no guidelines, and thus forces the courts to rely upon their own
discretion when determining which situations fall within the ambit of
the statute. It is not clear whether the legislature intended the courts
to exercise this wide power of discretion or whether the statute
is to be given its literal meaning. However, at the time the statute
was enacted it might have been possible that all aspects of the
2 Id. Section 404 states: "'RIOT' DEFINED. Any use of force or violence, disturbing
the public peace, or any threat to use such force or violence, if accompanied by im-
mediate power of execution, by two or more persons acting together, and without
authority of law, is a riot."
3 Cf. International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp.
65, 101 (D. Hawaii 1949).
4 'CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 405 (West 1955).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
riot problem were covered by the literal meaning of the statute,
and the legislature could not foresee that one day courts would be
required to exercise such a wide power of discretion.
A SIMILAR STATUTE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The problem of judicial use of discretion indirectly arose in
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Acker-
man8 where the court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of
The Assembly and Riot Act of the Territory of Hawaii.7 This Act
said that a riot consisted of three or more persons, being in unlaw-
ful assembly, joining in doing or actually beginning to do an act,
with tumult and violence, striking terror, or tending to strike terror
into others.' In declaring this Act unconstitutional, the court stated
that the test laid down by the Act was purely subjective and quite
vague.9 Furthermore, if this section were literally applied, an old
fashioned charivaril ° would come within the section's ambit. 1 The
court said that the test of reasonableness was absent from the Act;
hence, the Act was objectionable and unconstitutional. 2
The concept of vagueness rests on principles of substantive
due process which forbid the prohibition of certain individual free-
doms. '3 The test is whether the language of the statute, given its
normal meaning, is so broad that its sanctions may apply to con-
duct protected by the Constitution. 4 Frequently, the resolution
8 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
7 REV. LAWS OF HAWAII, 1945, § 11571. This statute was in effect and ruled un-
constitutional when Hawaii was still a territory of the United States. The statute was
never incorporated into Hawaii's present laws. The origin of the law is shrouded in
some obscurity. It came into written existence through the hands of the Honorable
William Little Lee, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii. On September
27, 1847, the King-appointed House of Nobles and Representatives of Hawaii, by
resolution, authorized Mr. Lee to examine the laws of Hawaii and in effect to compile
them. The unlawful assembly and riot act may perhaps have been in existence by
edict promulgation prior to 1833 when King Kamehameha III came to the throne.
The law appears in substance in the Penal Code of the Hawaiian Islands adopted by
the House of Representatives on June 21, 1850, known colloquially as "Lee's Com-
pilation." In any event it is clear that the statute predates the Hawaiian Constitution
of 1852 by at least two years.
The present anti-riot statute appears in HAWAII REV. STAT. § 764-1 (1968).
8 REV. LAWS OF HAWAII, 1945, § 11571.
9 International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65, 101
(D. Hawaii 1949).
10 A charivari is a mock serenade by beating on pans and making a lot of noise.
This "serenade" was often inflicted on newlyweds by their "friends." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 378 (1967).
11 82 F. Supp. 65, 101.
12 Id. at 101, 125.
13 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1968).




of this issue depends upon whether the statute permits police and
other authorities to wield unlimited discretionary powers in its
enforcement.' If the scope of the power permitted these officials
is so broad that the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct
depends on their own subjective views as to the propriety of the
conduct, the statute is unconstitutional. 6
These concepts have particular relevance to statutes touching
upon the areas of free speech and assembly. 7 Although the state
may regulate speech and assembly where the exercise of these
rights conflicts with certain state interests, it may regulate only to
the extent necessary to discharge these interests.'i A vague or
overbroad statute, however, is likely to have a deterrent effect
which is beyond that necessary to fulfill the state's interests.' 9
Rather than risk prosecution, people will tend to refrain from
speech and assembly which might come within the statute's ambit.20
California's Section 404 Compared With the Hawaii Act
Like The Assembly and Riot Act of the Territory of Hawaii,
section 404 offers only subjective tests. For purposes of this com-
ment, the activities which constitute a riot in California are divided
into three tests. These tests are: (a) any use of force or violence,
(b) disturbance of the public peace, or (c) threat to use force or
violence.2' As in the Hawaii Act it appears that the three tests
under section 404 are subjective and therefore insufficient.22 Fur-
thermore, the statute must provide a test of reasonableness. 3
Without this test it is difficult for the members of a court to reach
a fair decision in any factual situation concerning riotous activity,
because without that guideline the court cannot conform its opinion
to the popular conception of a riot. The courts will be left with
only the literal meaning of the statute. If this is the case, the
number of activities falling within the scope of the section will
border on the fantastic.
15 See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) ; Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
-mingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
16 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
17 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
18 See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931).
19 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
20 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963).
21 CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
22 International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65,
101 (D. Hawaii 1949).
23 Id. at 101.
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Confronted with these broad characterizations of a riot,
California courts have attempted to define boundaries around
those activities which may be riotous in nature.
Test (a): Any Use of Force or Violence
The first test of a riot under section 404, that is, any use of
force or violence by two or more persons acting without the au-
thority of law, is obviously vague on its face. Courts have held
that robberies, assaults and batteries are not riotous in nature, yet
these activities surely employ the use of force and violence. 4 On
the other hand, conduct such as an assembly of thirty or more per-
sons armed with clubs, sticks, blackjacks and metal cables, assault-
ing members of the public has been held riotous.2 5 Furthermore,
courts have had no difficulty finding a riot where thirty or more
persons converged on the public throwing large stones, seriously
injuring many persons.2 6
Apparently, somewhere between acts of battery and mass dis-
turbance lies the line which must be crossed before an act of force
or violence becomes riotous in nature. Case law has not clarified
the criteria to be used when determining what activities are riotous.
Of course, common sense may tell the court that a simple battery
cannot be riotous in nature if committed in a lonely spot where
there are no buildings nor even a stray passerby. However, those
activities which cause greater turmoil than a mere battery are
more difficult to construe. The court cannot always rely upon com-
mon sense for guidelines but must look to the statute for help.
Where the statute is vague, it affords the courts no help.
Under the rules of statutory construction, the words used in
a statute must be given their normal meaning.27 Hence, the words
"force and violence" employed in the first test under section 404
presumedly have their ordinary meanings. Force is defined as dy-
namic power or motion directed to an end."' Usually the word
connotes unlawful or wrongful action.29 Violence is defined as phys-
ical force.5 If these meanings are literally applied, the statute
offers to the courts the following test: Any physical force, dynamic
and powerful, being directed to an unlawful end is riotous. Surely
24 Connell v. Clark, 88 Cal. App. 2d 941, 951, 200 P.2d 26, 31-32 (1948).
25 People v. Montoya, 17 Cal. App. 2d 547, 62 P.2d 383 (1936).
26 People v. Bundte, 87 Cal. App. 2d 735, 197 P.2d 823 (1948).
27 State ex rel. Erickson v. Sanborn, 101 Ore. 686, 201 P. 430 (1921).
28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
29 Hafner Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 262 Mo. 621, 172 S.W. 28 (1914).
80 BrAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1742 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
[Vol. 10
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this first test, as is, gives no test of the reasonableness which is so
important in our judicial system."
Another penal statute used by California also appears to be
vague on its face. However, this statute is given a concise meaning
through case law. The statute is Penal Code section 242.32 The
wording of this statute is similar in wording to the first test offered
by section 404. Code section 242 defines a battery as any willful
and unlawful use of force or violence.33 Although this statute pro-
vides no test of reasonableness, case law is quite clear as to the
meaning of the statute. For example, violence and force used in
this context include any application of force even though it inflicts
no pain and leaves no mark. 4 Even though section 242 itself pro-
vides no test of reasonableness, case law has laid down the definite
meaning of the statute. This is not the same with section 404. Case
law has done little to clarify the exact manner in which the statute
is to be applied. Judges are left only to their own discretion in
many cases. Therefore, it is truly essential that a new statute be
enacted.
Test (b): Disturbance of the Public Peace
Under this test any activity which disturbs the public peace
may be riotous. 5 This offers no better clarification than that af-
forded by test (a). Again the test incorporated within the statute
purports to be subjective. The only guideline afforded is a breach
of the public peace. Lacking is the quality of reasonableness needed
to inform the court when a disturbance of the public peace has
become riotous.
The courts have attempted to delineate boundaries to ascer-
tain those activities disturbing the public peace which may be
classified as violations of section 404. One court said there was
clearly a disturbance of the public peace when the members of
an assembly were making a loud noise, even though there was no
proof of actual force or violence. 6 Blocking of a road by sixty to
eighty persons has also been found to be a disturbance of the pub-
81 International Longshoremen's & Ware. Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65, 101
(D. Hawaii 1949).
32 CAL. :PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1955). Section 242 was also enacted in 1872
and has not been amended since.
33 Id.
34 People v. James, 9 Cal. App. 2d 162, 163, 48 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1935) ; See also,
R. PERxKNS, CRI INAL LAW 107 (2d ed. 1969).
35 CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
36 People v. Dunn, 1 Cal. App. 2d 556, 559, 36 P.2d 1096, 1099 (1934).
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lic peace.17 However, in Lisse v. Local Union88 the Supreme Court
of California ruled that picketing as a means of persuasive induce-
ment is not a breach of the public peace and therefore not riotous
in nature. Before the Lisse ruling, courts assumed that picketing
in its very nature was calculated to and did incite crowds, riots,
and disturbances of the peace.89 This also appears to be the case
with political rallies and campus demonstrations of today. The riot
statute gives no guidelines which would offer any other choice, and
hence it seems that the Lisse decision was purely a product of the
court's discretion. ° If courts were to rely solely upon test (b) pro-
vided by section 404, it would be impossible for them to define
comprehensively or with exactness each and every act which may or
may not be legally done by members of an assembly; and it is
evident that any attempt to do so would lead into a field of unlimited
speculation. All that a court can do is deal with those specific
acts which by the evidence are shown to have been committed
and hope that it has reached a reasonable solution.
Test (c): Threat to Use Force or Violence
The final test offered by section 404 states that one may be
found guilty of a riot by making threats to use force or violence, if
accompanied by the immediate power of execution of those threats.4 '
The case law dealing with this test is much clearer than in the
areas previously discussed; however, there are still many problems
of vagueness and clarity. In People v. Dunn42 a conviction of riot
was affirmed based upon conduct by the defendants which indi-
cated they were going to use violence. Even though these threats
were made the violence was never carried out.4 3 Riotous conduct
was also found in cases of promotion of force and violence. In
People v. Bundte 4 defendant refused to order his union men to
stop fighting with nonunion men. Based upon this conduct the
court stated that the inference is that defendant thereby purposely
encouraged his men, the strikers, to continue the use of force and
violence just as much as they desired. 5 In the court's view this
conduct alone was enough to violate section 404. Thus, section
87 People v. Spear, 32 Cal. App. 2d 165, 167-68, 89 P.2d 445, 446 (1939).
88 2 Cal. 2d 312, 321, 41 P.2d 314, 322-23 (1935).
89 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 324 (1909).
40 It appears that the judge had a very difficult time reaching a decision and in
the end relied solely upon his own discretion.
41 CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
42 1 Cal. App. 2d 556, P.2d 1096 (1934).
43 Id. at 558, 36 P.2d at 1099.
44 87 Cal. App. 2d 735, 197 P.2d 823 (1948).
45 Id. at 740, 197 P.2d at 827.
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404 would make punishable a threat to use force and violence
even though the force and violence was never perpetrated; 46 sec-
tion 404 would also punish anyone who promotes force and violence
even though he did not actively take part in the actual use of the
force and violence he promoted.
47
Again these cases appear to represent only the obvious. But
what about the not so obvious? The statute's failure to supply a
test of reasonableness leaves the line separating riotous from non-
riotous threats vague, unclear and undefined.
A NEED FOR A CHANGE
A statute such as section 404 is a detriment to California's
law enforcement system. The statute merely sets forth three sub-
jective tests which may be used as guidelines.4" The statute is so
vague that it does not tell the courts what a person must do before
the statute has been violated. Thus, the public is left to act at its
own peril.
Of course, the courts could rely upon the literal meaning of
the statute, but, as stated earlier,49 if this were the case the number
of activities then falling within the realm of the statute would
border on the fantastic. Having neither test of reasonableness nor
standard to judge these different activities nor adequate precedent
set forth by previous decisions, the courts are left only to specula-
tion as to what solution should be reached.
Like The Assembly and Riot Act of the Territory of Hawaii,
California's statute presents too many problems to make it useful
any longer. The statute is outdated, antiquated and vague. It does
not present tests which can be used to solve modern day riot
problems. The subjective test, which may have been adequate in
1872, is no longer sufficient to cope with the new social attitudes
facing the courts of today. Nearly all areas which lie within the
modern day conception of a riot are left untouched by section 404.
It is time for a change.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
A possible solution is a statute constructed in such a manner
that the courts are given guidelines upon which they can rely
46 People v. Dunn, 1 Cal. App. 2d 556, 36 P.2d 1096 (1934).
47 People v. Bundte, 87 Cal. App. 2d 735, 197 P.2d 823 (1948).
48 CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
49 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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to determine when force or violence, disturbance of the public peace
or threats to use force or violence are to be considered riotous in
nature. California would be well enlightened by looking at other
jurisdictions which have achieved great success in solving this
problem.5" These jurisdictions have particularly and concisely set
forth guidelines which may be followed to determine precisely what
type of activity will be considered riotous.
The New York Statutes
In New York, for example, Penal Code sections 240.05 and
240.0651 present the crime of riot in two degrees in an effort to
conform their definition to the more popular conception of a riot.
The lesser degree, a misdemeanor, states that a person is guilty
of riot in the second degree when, acting with four or more other
persons, he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct which in-
tentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing
public alarm. 2 Unlike California's definition of a riot, New York
in -its statute attempts to describe what must result from the per-
petration of the required violent conduct. The statute has shifted
the emphasis from the act itself to the direct results of the act.
By doing this the statute has incorporated within its purview
both a subjective test and a test of reasonableness. The subjective
test is tumultuous and violent conduct.5 The test of reasonableness
is the intentional or reckless cause of grave public alarm.54 By
using these two tests together the courts should have little difficulty
reaching fair and just decisions.
New York courts seem to have no difficulty following their
statute.55 Therefore, little doubt is left as to what activity is needed
to constitute a riot. Intentional and reckless cause of grave public
alarm can be used as the underlying element essential to constitute
the crime. It is this element which the New York courts use to dis-
tinguish the crime of riot from other crimes involving breach of
the peace. In contrast, California's statutory definition offers no
such underlying element upon which the courts may rely.
Besides presenting the statutory crime of riot in the second
50 N.Y. PENA. LAW § 240.09-06 (McKinney 1967); MINN. STATS. ANN. § 609.71
(West 1964).
ti N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05-06 (McKinney 1967). These sections were enacted
in 1967 to change § 2090, which had been in effect since 1909.
52 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05 (McKinney 1967). "A person is guilty of riot in
the second degree when, simultaneously with four or more other persons, he engages in
tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or




I5 People v. Kearse, 56 Misc. 2d 586, 289 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Syracuse City Ct. 1968).
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degree, New York also defines a riot in the first degree.5" A person
is guilty of riot in the first degree when with ten or more other
persons he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct which in-
tentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing
public alarm and such conduct results in physical injury to one
other than a participant or in substantial property damage.57
Similar to the section defining a riot in the second degree, this
section sets forth both a subjective test and a test of reasonableness.
The subjective test is the use of tumultuous and violent conduct."8
The test of reasonableness is intentional or reckless cause of grave
public alarm and physical injury to one other than a participant,
or substantial property damage.59 Again, these tests may be used
in conjunction with one another by the courts to reach a decision
which will meet with modern day standards of a riot.
Proposed Action
If courts are to be relieved of the frustrations of trying to
determine just what conduct or activities are required to constitute
a riot, the legislature will have to first clarify its statutory definition.
Some guidelines must be supplied which the courts can follow with-
out unlimited speculation. It is suggested that the legislature adopt
a statute similar to that statute used by New York.
Proposed Statute
It is proposed that the California State Legislature adopt the
following statute to replace section 404.
A person shall be guilty of riot when he:
A. Uses force or violence in a public place which creates a
breach of the public peace; and
B. Causes personal injury to one other than a participant or
substantial property damage; and
C. Acts simultaneously with five or more persons; and
D. Acts without the authority of law.
Terry D. Grafi
56 N.Y. PEAL LAW § 240.06 (McKinney 1967).
57 Id. "A person shall be guilty of riot in the first degree when (a) simultaneously
with ten or more other persons he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and
thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public
alarm, and (b) in the course of and as a result of such conduct, a person other than
one of the participants suffers physical injury or substantial property damage occurs.
Riot in the first degree is a class E felony."
58 Id.
59 Id.
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